Accent Signage Shooting

September 27, 2012

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

AFTER ACTION REPORT

November 21, 2012

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Minneapolis Police Department responded to a mass shooting event at Accent Signage located at 2223 Chestnut Ave W, Minneapolis, MN. The original call was an unknown trouble, however, in en route to the incident, information was developed that this was a shooting with multiple victims. The first officers on scene entered the building in an attempt to stop the shooting, locating several victims that needed immediate medical care.

The coordinating sergeant requested EMS personnel to the building while the search was being completed, which allowed for the cooperative evacuation of victims between police, fire, and EMS personnel. As the patients were being evacuated, SWAT personnel arrived and began a systematic clearing of the building. The suspect was located deceased in the basement by SWAT personnel and all deceased victims were located on the main floor.

The determination, through intelligence sharing, that the incident was perpetrated by a single gunman was quickly made, so the perimeter was able to be reduced approximately three hours into the incident to allow for crime scene processing. The criminal investigation and crime lab personnel were able to complete the on scene investigation and release the scene within twenty-nine hours from the start of the incident.

The purpose of this report is to analyze the incident results, identify strengths to be maintained and built upon, identify potential areas for further improvement, and support development of corrective actions.

MAJOR STRENGTHS

The major strengths identified during this incident exemplify the cooperation between the City of Minneapolis departments and supporting agencies are as follows:

- The coordination between Minneapolis Police officers in the building, the Minneapolis Police sergeant on scene, Minneapolis Fire personnel, and Hennepin Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel allowed for the quick extraction of injured patients and rapid transport to a medical facility. All injured patients were out of the building and either at HCMC or en route to HCMC within twenty four minutes of the first call for help.
- Initial responding officers immediately entered the building to stop the potential threat, identify locations of victims, and secure a corridor for emergency medical personnel to enter and evacuate patients.
- The amount of law enforcement resources that responded to the incident was adequate to ensure scene security and manage the response.

PRIMARY AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Throughout the incident, several opportunities for improvement in the Minneapolis Police Department's ability to respond to the incident were identified. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

- There was no clear established unified command between departments, agencies, and disciplines on scene. The recommendation is to train using unified command and the routine use of unified command on smaller, controlled scenes during everyday response.
- There was no clear tracking system to account for all resources on scene. The recommendation is to establish, and implement, a consistent resource tracking system for events.
- The decision to maintain the entire event on the main police channel hindered the exchange of information and command objectives outside of the building. There is also conflicting information if and when a second radio channel was established and the use of it communicated to responders on the scene. The recommendation is to examine the use of a second radio channel for command communications, and that Fire and EMS commanders/supervisors should be included on this command channel to facilitate unified command.

The response to the incident was a success and demonstrated the effectiveness of the integrated department training that occurred around active shooter response. The incident also demonstrated that the department, the city, and responding agencies were able to quickly integrate into an effective response.

SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

INCIDENT DETAILS

Type of Incident

The department responded to a mass shooting incident inside a business that initially was identified as an active shooter.

Incident Start Date

Thursday, September 27, 2012 at 1636 hours.

Incident End Date

Friday, September 28, 2012 at 2107 hours.

Duration

28 hours, 30 minutes from initial call to when the scene was released.

Location

2322 Chestnut Avenue W, Minneapolis, MN 55405

INCIDENT STATISTICS

MECC

- During the first 17 minutes of the incident, there were a total of 104 phone calls received and/or placed from MECC, 79 were 911 calls or callbacks, and 25 were on the administrative lines.
- Sixteen of the 911 calls received by MECC were directly related to the incident.
- The first call of Unknown Trouble was entered at 16:35:53; the call was updated to a Shooting at 16:36:13.
- The MPD unit was assigned via CAD at 16:36:47 and arrived on scene at 16:39:23.

RESPONSE

- 1st Squad on scene two minutes, thirty seconds after initial dispatch.
- 2nd Squad on scene three minutes after initial dispatch. Both squads immediately enter the building.
- MPD Supervisor on scene two minutes after squads entered building.
- MFD arrived on scene five minutes after initial dispatch.
- MPD brought in Hennepin EMS personnel within 9 minutes of initial dispatch to evacuate patients.
- 1st Ambulance on scene a total of 6 minutes, 11 seconds.
- 2nd Ambulance on scene a total of 11 minutes, 43 seconds.
- 3rd Ambulance on scene a total of 9 minutes, 1 second.
- Entire building secured 1 hour 35 minutes after initial call.

INVESTIGATION

- 25 witnesses and victims were interviewed on site.
- 25 Discharged Cartridge Casings were recovered at the incident site.
- 6 victims deceased, 3 victims injured, 1 suspect deceased.

INVOLVED ORGANIZATIONS

The following organizations were either involved in the response or provided a support role during the incident.

Number of Responders

- Minneapolis Police Department Employees: 112
- Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center: 16
- Minneapolis Fire Department Employees: 13
- Hennepin EMS Employees: 23
- Hennepin County Sheriff's Office Employees: 78
- Minnesota State Patrol Employees: 8
- East Metro SWAT: 2
- Brooklyn Park SWAT: 10
- FBI: 4
- ATF: 1

SECTION 2: ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE

This section of the report reviews the performance of the response to the event. In this section, observations are organized by capability and associated activities. The capabilities linked to the incident response are listed below, followed by corresponding activities. Each observed activity during the Accent Signage Shooting is followed by related observations, which include references, analysis, and recommendations.

CAPABILITY 1: COMMUNICATIONS

Capability Summary: Communications is the fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions, and communications operability is the ability of public safety agencies and service agencies to talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems. It is essential that public safety has the intra agency operability it needs.

ACTIVITY 1.1: ALERT AND DISPATCH

In response to an alert, make notification and provide communications management until the Incident Command (IC) is stood up.

Observation 1.1.1: Implement incident communications interoperability plans and protocols.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: MECC immediately identified that the incident would remain on the main police channel and moved all other radio traffic for the precincts to a separate channel.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 1.1.2: Communicate incident response information.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: Due to the use of only one radio channel, the air was constantly being held by officers on the inside of the building, and the coordinating sergeant. This limited ability to exchange information amongst command and responders on the radio. There is also confusion about when and if a second radio channel was added to the incident of the use of law enforcement, and how that was communicated.

Recommendations: Identify the need for adding another radio channel to divide interior incident communication and a command/response channel to communicate with exterior incident coordination. In addition to identifying the need, ensuring that all responders, including those from other disciplines, have the information about a second radio channel being used and how to communicate with each other.

1. Identify the appropriate time to add a second radio channel to provide communication between command and responders.
2. Identify a radio channel that will allow communication between incident commanders in unified command.
3. Practice using multiple channels and communications between multiple disciplines to ensure the flow of communications.

Observation 1.1.3: Use established common response communications language to ensure information dissemination is timely, clear, acknowledged, and understood by all receivers.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: Common response communications language was used by responding personnel, and MECC personnel who were monitoring the radio, ensured that all information was clear, acknowledged, and disseminated properly. Plain language is normally used in this jurisdiction, and that practice was continued for this response.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 1.1.4: Request external resources using mutual aid/assistance processes.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 6-101, 6-104, 6-111, 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: It was unclear through the interview process where the request for mutual aid assistance originated from during the incident. The request was made for the use of the MN State Patrol Helicopter if available through MECC. There were several law enforcement agencies that called into MECC to offer their assistance, and there was a clear request from the Tactical Commander on scene for the use of the East Metro SWAT Bear Cat, however, the activation of the additional responding agencies was not as clear after several interviews.

Recommendations: The recommendation is to ensure that the clear process for

requesting mutual aid is followed that is outlined Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section 6-104.01. Along with following policy, Minneapolis should take the lead to include communications and training with mutual aid agencies so that they do not tie up MECC resources during an event by calling to offer help, they would clearly understand the process and activation.

Observation 1.1.5: Ensure that all critical communications networks are functioning.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: All critical communications networks were functioning and monitored during the entire event, including the patching of the main police channel to a PTAC channel so that assisting law enforcement agencies could communicate. There was an attempt to create a command channel for unified command on a LTAC, however, MFD does not have access to the LTAC channels in their portables.

Recommendations:

1. Review and identify a common command channel that law enforcement, fire personnel, and EMS will be able to use to communicate with each other as part of unified command.
2. Ensure that all disciplines have the ability to use LTAC, PTAC, ETAC, and FTAC channels so that in complex situations everyone can communicate.

ACTIVITY 1.2: PROVIDE INCIDENT COMMAND, FIRST RESPONDER INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

In response to notification of an incident, go to the scene to provide and receive interoperable voice data and video communications.

Observation 1.2.1: Coordinate incident site communications to be consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) framework.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: All law enforcement responding personnel, and command personnel, were able to communicate with each other using 800 Mhz radios, however, there were communication issues among other departments, such as MFD and EMS. Also, the limitations of having the entire event on just one channel restricted the ability of Incident Command to communicate objectives, needs, and actions while the site was still being searched.

Finally, there is the need to follow the appropriate command structure when communicating changes, decisions, and asking questions that need to go

through incident command before being relayed to dispatch. An example of this was the movement of the Command Post several times, with each move being dictated by a different person who was not the Incident Commander. Once the Incident Commander established a Command Post location, all changes should have gone through the IC before being aired to limit confusion.

Recommendations:

1. Review the recommendation made in 1.1.5 about having a common communication channel for unified command.
2. Review and train on proper radio procedures using Incident Command and ensure that the proper command structure is followed before relaying information.
3. Encourage the use of face to face communication with unified command, especially in the early stages of the event. The relationship created during face to face communications will ensure that unified decision making can occur, all disciplines have the correct information, and that rapid decision making will be effective during the most chaotic portion of an event.

ACTIVITY 1.3: RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS

Initiate deactivation procedures for the interoperable communications system and return the system to a ready state.

Observation 1.3.1: Develop communications section of the demobilization plan.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: There was no official demobilization plan created as part of the Incident Command, however, MECC did document the plan to release radio channels and resume normal communications.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 1.3.2: Initiate interoperable deactivation procedures.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-106, 7-107, 7-108, 7-109, 7-110, 7-111, 7-114, 7-115, 7-117, 7-911

Analysis: MECC followed all policies, procedures, and plans to deactivate interoperability and return to normal communications.

Recommendations: None.

CAPABILITY 2: INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING AND DISSEMINATION

Capability Summary: The goal of sharing and dissemination of intelligence and information is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to those who need it.

ACTIVITY 2.1: INCORPORATE ALL STAKEHOLDERS IN INFORMATION FLOW

Identify and share information with all pertinent stakeholders across all disciplines through a clearly defined information system. Share information vertically within law enforcement and other appropriate agencies in a timely manner. Share information across disciplines at all levels and across jurisdictions in a timely and efficient manner.

Observation 2.1.1: Share information and/or intelligence by using clearly defined mechanisms/processes.

References: None

Analysis: The information and intelligence sharing between the SWAT Negotiation Team and the Criminal Investigation Division had some barriers. It was unclear which personnel were interviewing victims and witnesses, who was accountable for their location, and who was keeping track. There was also miscommunication about intelligence gathering and there was duplication of effort by both units.

There appeared to be confusion on both sides on which personnel should be accomplishing tasks, and there was no clear partnering of resources so that each unit could get the information they needed in a timely manner. There was also confusion about the role of each unit at various times in the incident. In an incident where all resources were being used, and where resources could have been easily overwhelmed, it is clear that both units can complement and assist each other. These role confusions could be easier to clarify when there are clear objectives set by the Incident Commander.

Recommendations:

1. Review the roles of both the SWAT Negotiation Team and CID during an incident.
2. Determine appropriate responsibilities during incidents based upon the objectives of the Incident Commander and the dynamics of the situation.
3. Identify ways to create partnerships between Negotiators and Investigators in order to gain relevant information and intelligence in an expedient manner.

Observation 2.1.2: Disseminate relevant information and/or intelligence products to

street-level law enforcement personnel.

References: None

Analysis: The identity of the suspect was quickly discovered, and the SIC was able to push out a photograph of the suspect to those on scene who had smartphones. A limited number of people were able to receive the photograph, but it proved valuable when the suspect was located in confirming his identity. All personnel were given a verbal description of the suspect's description and were updated on the progress inside the incident address.

Recommendations:

1. The value of having smartphones available to all street level law enforcement personnel, or at least all street level supervisors, was clearly demonstrated in the ability to disseminate the suspect information.

CAPABILITY 3: EMERGENCY PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE

Capability Summary: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. This capability requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

ACTIVITY 3.1: COMMAND AND CONTROL PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

In response to a notification for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization.

Observation 3.1.1: Identify personnel needed to maintain security support and response.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The overwhelming response of law enforcement personnel to the event provided a large pool of resources that could be used to address all safety and security needs. Sgt. Mosey quickly established command and control of the inside of the scene; however, there was no clear supervisor who established command and control of the immediate perimeter to direct resources. Finally, there were no clear supervisors who took command and control of the outer perimeter, responding resources, or victim/witness accountability. These areas were not clearly addressed until Incident Command had been transferred to Inspector Martin.

These issues of outside command and control could have been addressed on the scene since there were a large number of supervisors on the scene, however, it appeared many of them were waiting to be directed by the Incident Commander instead of recognizing an area of need and starting to exert control until the Incident Command was completely in place.

Recommendations:

1. Identify gaps in understanding and training for supervisors on implementing command and control in larger situations.
2. Address these gaps by creating policy, training, or a combination of the two to provide guidance for supervisors in implementing command and control.

3. Institute a cultural expectation that command and control incidents should be addressed in smaller incidents so that the practice is accepted and can be scaled for incidents of larger scope.

Observation 3.1.2: Establish staging areas for law enforcement to conduct personnel assignment and briefing prior to entering the impacted area.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: An initial reporting location was given by the sergeant on the scene, and there were several identified Command Post locations, but there was no clear staging area for law enforcement personnel to respond to, be accounted for, be assigned, and to be briefed before deploying.

Recommendations:

1. Establish a procedure for law enforcement personnel to designate a staging area, which is a component of NIMS. In the procedure, identify that once the staging area is designated; identify a staging area manager that will supervise the accountability, assignments, briefings, and deployment of all personnel.
2. Once the procedure has been identified, train personnel on the procedure to ensure that any potential staging area managers understand their responsibilities, and all responding personnel understand to report to the staging area.
3. Implement the use of the staging area, and staging area managers, for all responses in the city that include response cars, special events, or planned events to continue to reinforce the practice into the law enforcement culture.

Observation 3.1.3: Deploy appropriate relief personnel for public safety and security.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The situation report and operations plan for the second and third operational period designated relief personnel were taking over perimeter positions, however, there was no clear relief plan during the first operational period, which resulted in several of the initial officers being place on perimeter positions for long periods of time.

Recommendations:

1. The creation of a relief plan for public safety and security personnel needs to be included in initial planning activities to ensure that personnel are not placed in positions where they are unable to get relief.
2. Training on creating relief plans needs to take place with supervisory staff to

understand the need for relief, what types of relief plans should be created, and how to appropriately implement relief plans.

Observation 3.1.4: Coordinate public safety and security operations with Incident Command.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: Since the Incident Commander was a ranking law enforcement officer, all public safety and security operations was coordinated with Incident Command.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 3.1.5: Arrange for shelter, housing, and feeding for law enforcement personnel.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: Initially, the Salvation Army was on site to help provide for the feeding of law enforcement personnel, however, they were asked to leave the scene. At that point, there were no official arrangements for food or shelter for on scene personnel. One of the deficiencies that many of those interviewed, and who were on the scene, mentioned that there was a lack of bathroom facilities on site because the incident location was a crime scene and that this is a problem that should be planned for in the future for all event types.

The availability of the Mobile Command One on the scene was useful for the tactical command, however, there was not enough room inside for Incident Command, and it did not provide a feasible work area for investigators or crime scene personnel. The lack of facilities was evident when there were no private areas to interview witnesses at the scene, and there was no place for law enforcement personnel to work if inclement weather had arrived.

Recommendations:

1. Evaluate ability to provide food and water to on scene personnel. This process should be included in response plans so that on scene incident command personnel understand how to activate the response.
2. Identify ability to arrange for bathroom facilities at various incident sites. This process should be included in response plans so that on scene incident command personnel understand how to activate the response.
3. Evaluate the needs for available workspace for investigators and crime scene personnel when responding to large events.

4. Evaluate the Fire and EMS disciplines' Rehab program and implement similar procedures for Law Enforcement.

Observation 3.1.8: Arrange for proper sheltering, care, and feeding of victims, witnesses, family, and friends.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: There is currently no clear protocol in place to manage victims, witnesses, family, and friends at scenes. At this scene, everyone was rounded up and brought to the tennis court area, where they were interviewed by investigators and negotiators. Eventually, a MTC bus was ordered, and the remaining impacted victims were transported to the 4th Police Precinct where they were able to coordinate further transportation and receive assistance from the Police Chaplains. One problem that arose was that this center was shut down at 2000 hours with no further information being provided to MECC or other law enforcement personnel on who was the contact for further information requests from impacted individuals.

Recommendations:

1. A protocol needs to be developed to address the management of impacted individuals at all crime scenes. The transportation, housing, and sheltering of impacted individuals is not currently consistent, and a protocol would create consistency on more common incidents and could easily be scaled to manage larger incidents.
2. An accountability tracking system also needs to be used to manage the identification of impacted individuals, their location, contact information, and the process, such as interviews, that each individual has already completed.

Observation 3.1.9: Utilize available technologies to maintain accountability of personnel, track hot zone locations, and track resources.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: There was no clear, central tracking or accountability for personnel and resources on the scene. However, available technologies were useful to disseminate information to law enforcement personnel involved in the search inside the incident address because the supervisors with smart phones had a picture of the suspect during the search.

Recommendations:

1. The use of an established system of personnel accountability and tracking needs to be identified and implemented. This accountability system could

consist of a sign in system at the staging area, a roll call through radio dispatch, or another identified system that can be practiced in smaller incidents and can be scaled for larger events.

2. Explore existing tools used by the Fire and EMS disciplines for accountability.

ACTIVITY 3.2: ACTIVATE PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE

Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to being operations.

Observation 3.2.1: Conduct a public safety and security response.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The first three officers that arrived on the scene immediately entered the building to neutralize the active shooter. These officers were able to clear a section of the main floor where they located several victims that needed immediate emergency medical services. As further personnel arrived, coordination took place to move resources into perimeter positions and to provide security for EMS personnel to remove victims. An effective public safety and security response was maintained the entire time law enforcement personnel were on scene.

Recommendations: None

Observation 3.2.2: Establish or integrate into Incident Command/Unified Command.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The initial incident commander was at the entrance of the building and was coordinating the tactical response. The arrival of Inspector Martin, who assumed Incident Command, was the formal start of the establishment of Incident Command/Unified Command. There was no real point where Unified Command was established with MFD and Hennepin EMS, even though leaders from all three departments were on scene. This part of unified command was not deemed necessary since all injured victims had been removed from the scene.

A problem with the lack of unified command was the communication of information and personnel accountability. As an example, the last ambulance crew was staged right in front of the address, anticipating a fourth critical patient, but was given no updates for fifty minutes. The decision to not have unified command created lack of communication and the perceived exposure made the last ambulance crew uncomfortable and questioning their safety.

As Incident Command developed, there was integration of MPD and HCSO

personnel into the command structure, however, there was not a true Unified Command established.

Recommendations:

1. The immediate establishment of unified command on scene will help facilitate decision making amongst MPD, MFD, and EMS personnel, and should be maintained while all departments are on the scene, regardless of the level of involvement.
2. The initial unified command would have also been a conduit for information and accountability across the disciplines so that law enforcement knows the placement of everyone on the scene, and can ensure all disciplines are on the same page.

Observation 3.2.3: Coordinate and receive instructions from tactical operations.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: Tactical personnel arrived early into the incident and tactical operations were coordinated at the incident site until the Incident Command was set up. As tactical commanders arrived on scene, all tactical operations were coordinated through the Operations Section and Incident Command. The total time spent on tactical operations was 1 hour 37 minutes before the scene was declared under control and the entire building had been searched.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 3.2.4: Ensure that responders have the appropriate equipment to perform assigned tasks.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: Initial officers took long guns into the building, and all responding personnel had the appropriate equipment to perform their assigned tasks. EMS personnel carried victims out of the building to receive medical care.

Recommendations: None.

ACTIVITY 3.3: ASSESS THE INCIDENT SCENE AND SECURE THE AREA.

Upon arriving on scene, assess for immediate rescue needs, for remaining safety and security threats, and initiate security operations.

Observation 3.3.1: Secure the incident site.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The perimeter was set up initially to account for the possibility that the suspect had escaped the building. Also, it was unknown to most law enforcement personnel on scene that the building actually contained two separate businesses. The actual incident site was secured quickly.

Recommendations:

1. Add a MECC Caution Alert to the address to ensure that all responders will know that there is a separate business in the basement that has a separate street address, but shares a physical building.

Observation 3.3.2: Determine the appropriate medical personnel to respond on-site for injuries and fatalities.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The on scene MPD Supervisor, and personnel inside the business, immediately recognized that EMS personnel were going to be needed to treat victims before the entire building had been secured. 3 ECHO, the prior training that the MPD and MFD had conducted in the last two years working on creating evacuation corridors and moving injured victims from areas under police escort, was used in this incident. MFD and Hennepin EMS personnel were brought into the areas where injured victims were located, quickly confirmed deceased victims, and were able to evacuate the injured.

Recommendations:

1. Continue to build partnerships with EMS personnel so that the trust is in place for a response in this type of situation.
2. Continue to train with EMS personnel on this immediate response for injuries.
3. Work with EMS personnel on smaller incidents to reinforce the learned behaviors of briefing, determining evacuation corridors, and evacuation of patients so that the behaviors become second nature and the response can be scaled to the event.
4. Ensure that everyone understands their roles since 3 ECHO training focuses on fire personnel to evacuate patients so that EMS personnel can provide rapid treatment and transport. Fire did carry the first patient, but EMS personnel were involved with carrying the other patients. This needs to be clarified during training.

Observation 3.3.3: Report findings to IC/UC upon deployment of specialized LE teams.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: SWAT personnel were in constant radio communication with dispatch and the Incident Commander.

Recommendations: None

ACTIVITY 3.4: CONTROL TRAFFIC, CROWD, AND SCENE

Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area. Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to maintain law and order.

Observation 3.4.1: Identify and establish an incident perimeter, zones, and security requirements.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The initial lack of command and control in this area was addressed once Incident Command was transferred to Inspector Martin because he was able to view the incident from a different vantage point. Inner perimeters, as well as outer perimeters, were established, and a gathering point was identified for victims and witnesses. The establishment of the perimeter allowed for identification of security needs, and once the scene was secured, the perimeter was reduced for the duration of the event.

The lack of command and control of the perimeter also created blocked ingress and egress routes for all first responders. This limits EMS' ability to transport and respond, as well as limiting all other first responders and arriving mutual aid resources.

Recommendations:

1. This recommendation focuses on ensuring that someone takes control of immediately identifying perimeters and is accountable for the resources assigned to those tasks.
2. Someone needs to take responsibility to ensure that ingress and egress routes are open for all first responders.

Observation 3.4.2: Implement and maintain an on-scene personnel identity management system.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: This is a problem area because to this day, there is no complete list of all the personnel that were on the scene. This led to confusion on who was assigned to specific tasks, when resources were demobilized, and accountability for the actions of those resources.

Recommendations:
1. Identify an on-scene personnel identity management system that can be used at events no matter the scope or size.
2. Train personnel on the use of the management system.
3. Implement the adoption of the management system.
4. Enforce the use of the management system.

Observation 3.4.3: Control traffic and crowds.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: Traffic and crowds were controlled; however, several personnel on scene remarked that the media was very close to the Command Post, even though there were technically outside the perimeter. This also put the media very close to the victim/survivors while they were being interviewed.

Recommendations:
1. Evaluate the placement of the perimeter in relationship to the command post and gathering areas for impacted individuals.

ACTIVITY 3.5: CONDUCT LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Take appropriate actions and investigative steps to complete operation.

Observation 3.5.1: Coordinate with investigators to interview witnesses/bystanders to conduct investigation.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The MPD CID Unit, MPD SWAT Negotiations Team, and HCSO Investigators coordinated to conduct interviews of twenty-five victims and witnesses. There were coordination issues between CID and the Negotiation Team; however, all interviews were completed. HCSO Investigators were able to conduct several interviews that helped triage the amount of information each person had, which prioritized follow up interviews.

Recommendations:
1. Continue to work on partnerships and roles between CID and SWAT

Negotiation Team.

Observation 3.5.2: Provide security for public officials and investigation teams.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: The security of the scene was strong, and all crime scene personnel and investigators were able to conduct their duties in a safe environment. A note related to this observation focused on the authorization of personnel to enter the crime scene given by upper management that was not coordinated with CID Investigators which caused some minor disruptions to the investigation at this scene, but could cause potential major disruptions at crime scenes in the future.

Recommendations:
1. Continue to coordinate any entrance into crime scenes through CID Investigators and Commanders to ensure that the integrity of the investigation is maintained.

ACTIVITY 3.6: DEMOBILIZE PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Return to normal operations.

Observation 3.6.1: Clear the incident scene upon completion of assigned temporary duties, or as directed by supervisors.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: All personnel demobilized and completed required reports as directed.

Recommendations: None

Observation 3.6.2: Debrief all out processing personnel.

References: Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-810, 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905, 7-911.

Analysis: CISM sessions were offered to all personnel who responded to the incident and were successful in debriefing not only law enforcement personnel, but also EMS, Fire, and other assisting personnel. This provided a safe environment to discuss reactions to the event.

Recommendations: Continue to follow critical incident policy and ensure that debriefings are available to all personnel.

CAPABILITY 4: ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Capability Summary: Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

ACTIVITY 4.1: DIRECT ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In response to indication of an incident, implement management, planning, and coordination of on-site incident.

Observation 4.1.1: Establish and maintain communication with dispatch center and responding units.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905.

Analysis: Communication was maintained with dispatch and all responding units via radio at all times during the incident.

Recommendations: None

Observation 4.1.2: Direct and coordinate with arriving first responders.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: Sgt. Mosey directed and coordinated with arriving first responders, including coordinating the evacuation of injured victims. The coordination remained with Incident Command throughout the event, although as the search was going inside the address, there were communication gaps on where first responders were to respond to and many had to be directed once they arrived on the scene.

Recommendations:

1. The breakdown in communication could be addressed by having a separate radio channel for responding personnel to get direction.
2. The creating of a staging area would also address ensuring that all first responders knew where to report to and be assigned from.

Observation 4.1.3: Monitor/measure performance of assigned resources and request additional resources as needed.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: Additional resources were available before the official incident command was implemented on site. Additional resources, such as fire personnel,

EMS, crime scene personnel, and transportation were all requested at the appropriate time.

Recommendations: None

ACTIVITY 4.2: IMPLEMENT ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

In response to an incident, arrive on scene and provide initial scene report while beginning response operations; carry out management, planning, and coordination of on-site incident.

Observation 4.2.1: Transfer command between oncoming and outgoing Incident Commander as appropriate.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: The transfer of command went smoothly between Sgt. Mosey to Inspector Martin, and then to each subsequent Incident Commander until the incident address was cleared.

Recommendations: Unified command, fire and EMS, also needs to be included in this transfer of command to get the most accurate information on the situation.

ACTIVITY 4.3: ESTABLISH FULL ON-SITE INCIDENT COMMAND

Establish staff and facilities necessary to conduct on-site incident command.

Observation 4.3.1: Establish the command structure to manage the incident and manage objectives.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: Inspector Martin established the command structure when he assumed Incident Command, although there was initial confusion over who was available to fill positions and what the required duties of the positions were. There was also not a central location for Incident Command to work out of, so many members of the command structure worked in different areas and had to be sought out when information needed to be exchanged.

The separation of command and operations needs to occur as soon as possible in an incident of this scope. In daily activity, command and operations are roles that can be filled by just the incident commander; however, in events in this scope, all disciplines need to separate the two roles.

Recommendations:

1. Train the Command Staff to work together in the Incident Command structure. All have had training; however, they need to work together in training settings

to find the cohesion needed as a team, and to understand the responsibilities and expectations in the Incident Command system.
2. Identify an area for the Incident Command to manage the incident, which may not be in the Command Post truck due to space limitations and the use of the truck by SWAT.
3. Identify scribes and runners that can be used by the Incident Command personnel so that they can remain in the management area, but can still get information and directions to those who need them.

Observation 4.3.3: Establish branches, groups, and divisions needed to manage the incident and meet incident objectives, strategies, and tactics.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: Once the Incident Command was formally established, the Operations Section identified appropriate divisions to meet incident objectives and strategies. These same divisions were addressed in by Planning for each operational period.

Recommendations:
1. Continue to train and review with Command Staff the responsibilities of the Operations Section Chief and Planning Section Chief.

Observation 4.3.4: Establish an incident command post, incident bases, staging areas, and other facilities as required.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: The Command Post was moved several times before it was placed in a safe location. There were no staging areas identified, not any recovery/rehab areas for responding personnel. The lack of these areas has been addressed in prior recommendations.

Recommendations:
1. Follow NIMS in establishing not only the command post, but other important areas to manage resources.

Observation 4.3.5: Coordinate operations with specialized emergency response teams.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: Coordinated operations occurred between the SWAT team, the Bomb Squad, and other responding law enforcement personnel.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 4.3.6: Transition from incident command to unified command for incidents involving a single jurisdiction with multi-agency involvement.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: The only transition was the inclusion of HCSO in the Incident Command structure at the scene. No unified command was set up even though there were multi-agencies responding, and there were multiple departments from the city involved in the incident.

Recommendations:
1. Review of the use of unified command and the appropriate implementation of unified command at incidents should be conducted from the street level supervisor all the way through the command staff.

Observation 4.3.7: Implement processes to order, track, and assign incident resources.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: This problem has been addressed in previous sections, but there is no process in place that is used consistently by MPD to order, track, and assign incident resources.

Recommendations:
1. As stated in prior recommendations, these processes need to be identified, adopted, implemented, and enforced to provide accountability on scenes.

ACTIVITY 4.4: DEVELOP IAP AND EXECUTE PLAN

Develop all necessary components of the IAP and obtain approval, implement plan to achieve the desired and incident objectives.

Observation 4.4.1: Develop the incident action plan (IAP) to establish priorities, procedures, and actions to be accomplished to meet the incident objectives.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: The formal IAP was not used, however, Inspector Martin, the Incident Commander, and his staff produced a Situation Report and Operations Plan for the second operational period which was 09/27/2012 2200 hours to 09/28/2012 0600 hours. A Situation Report and Operations Plan was also created for the third, and final operational period, on 09/28/2012 from 1000-2200 hours. Both of these Situation Reports are located in the attached Appendixes E and F.

Recommendations:

1. Creation of an IAP template for the use by all Incident Commanders will provide consistent documentation for all events to be used by the city.
2. Incident Commanders need to be reminded that documentation needs to also be completed for the first operational period.

Observation 4.4.2: Direct personnel accountability, develop mechanisms for controlling incident, and evaluate, revise, and prioritize tactics to meet incident developments.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-905

Analysis: The IAP was updated to reflect the changing objectives of the incident while the criminal investigation and crime scene processing was taking place. There was still no system in place to account for all personnel.

Recommendations:

1. The implementation of a personnel (or resource) management system would address personnel accountability in this observation.

CAPABILITY 5: RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH

Capability Summary: Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

ACTIVITY 5.1: DIRECT RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Upon dispatch of responders, provide management and coordination of Responder Safety and Health capability through demobilization.

Observation 5.1.1: Monitor and maintain routine and emergency communications within the incident command structure at all times during the incident.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905

Analysis: All communications were monitored by ICS staff and dispatch at all times during the incident.

Recommendations:

1. Maintain current response and communication procedures.

Observation 5.1.2: Ensure ongoing safety and health assessments of response operations.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-810, 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905

Analysis: Although no official safety officer was appointed to monitor the incident, the individual supervisors fulfilled the safety officer role to continually monitor the situation. Hennepin EMS personnel noted that they felt safer at this incident due to the law enforcement protection they received when evacuating patients than they felt on a “normal” shooting call where the scene is considered under control.

Recommendations:

1. Consider filling the role of safety officer in the ICS structure to provide consistent oversight of the incident.
2. A safety officer would be able to have an overview of the event and be able to note first responders who are in positions that could be dangerous, or who have not been given appropriate information on safe locations.

Observation 5.1.3: Provide critical incident stress management (CISM) strategies,

programs, and teams.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-810, 7-901, 7-902, 7-904, 7-905

Analysis: CISM and other assistances were provided to all personnel that responded to the scene. This assistance was extended to other agencies and departments that responded.

Recommendations:

1. Maintain current CISM response and continue to follow current Critical Incident Policy to manage personnel.

CAPABILITY 6: EMERGENCY TRIAGE AND PRE-HOSPITAL TREATMENT

Capability Summary: Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility.

ACTIVITY 6.1: DIRECT TRIAGE AND PRE-HOSPITAL TREATMENT TACTICAL OPERATIONS

In response to a notification for emergency medical assets, provide the overall management and coordination of the Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Response, through to demobilization.

Observation 6.1.1: Coordinate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with on-site Incident Command.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: The initial Incident Commander directed EMS to victims and helped facilitate the evacuation; however, there was not established coordination of triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with on-site Incident Command.

Recommendations:

1. The continuing recommendation of training and practice of Incident Command at the immediate street supervisor level that emphasizes immediate establishment of Incident and Unified Command that coordinates with MFD and Hennepin EMS is relevant to address this issue.

Observation 6.1.2: Implement and coordinate effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS and incident command.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Sections: 7-106, 7-905

Analysis: There was not an established communication method available between Incident Command and EMS except for face to face interaction.

Recommendations:

1. The earlier discussion and recommendation for the use of a command channel that linked MPD, MFD, and Hennepin EMS would address this issue. MFD and Hennepin EMS already practice interoperable communications regularly and this practice could be extended to include MPD through the use

of PTAC channels.

Observation 6.1.3: Assess the need for additional medical resources; initiate extra staffing to provide for immediate surge capacity.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: MFD requested extra personnel to respond to the scene to ensure coverage when all personnel were transported with the first three ambulances. EMS supervisors also requested additional ambulance resources to be staged in anticipation of the need for additional medical resources.

Recommendations: None.

ACTIVITY 6.2: TRIAGE, PROVIDE TREATMENT, AND TRANSPORT

Once on scene, provide initial and ongoing emergency medical triage of injured patients that prioritizes their respective treatment and transport. Provide medical treatment appropriate to the patient's injuries and the incident. Transport injured patients via the most appropriate mode of transport available while providing ongoing medical assessment and treatment en route to the receiving facility.

Observation 6.2.1: Move patients to safe, secure, and easily accessible treatment area(s).

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: The first ambulance crew was on scene for a total of six minutes, eleven seconds from when they arrived in CAD, met with fire, got to the loading dock, coordinated with MPD, checked three patients, evacuated their patient, and left the scene en route to HCMC. The second ambulance crew was on scene for eleven minutes, forty-three seconds from arrival to transport of their victim, and the third ambulance crew was on scene a total of nine minutes.

Due to the nature of the incident, and the severity of the injuries of the victims, rapid transport was the method used at the scene instead of setting up a triage or treatment area. This is consistent with the 3 ECHO Hostile Events Training that is being implemented in the region.

Recommendations:

1. Continue to expand the 3 ECHO training to include all first responders in the Region so that everyone shares the same level of understanding of the concepts.
2. Train and practice implementing the 3 ECHO response in multi-agency settings.

Observation 6.2.2: Provide pre-hospital treatment appropriate to the nature of the incident and number of injured.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: All injured victims were transported to HCMC via Hennepin EMS Ambulance with pre-hospital treatment being administered en route. Each Ambulance with a victim from inside the business was supported by MFD personnel.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 6.2.3: Identify transport vehicles, victims, and priority of transport.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: The first ambulance crew was on scene for a total of six minutes, eleven seconds from when they arrived in CAD, met with fire, got to the loading dock, coordinated with MPD, checked three patients, evacuated their patient, and left the scene en route to HCMC. The second ambulance crew was on scene for eleven minutes, forty-three seconds from arrival to transport of their victim, and the third ambulance crew was on scene a total of nine minutes.

Recommendations: None.

Observation 6.2.4: Coordinate and transport patients to the appropriate treatment facility.

References: Minneapolis Police Policy and Procedure Manual Section: 7-905.

Analysis: All injured victims were transported to HCMC via Hennepin EMS Ambulance. Each Ambulance with a victim from inside the business was supported by MFD personnel.

Recommendations: None.

SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this was a very successful response to an active shooter, mass shooting incident. The quick response of law enforcement personnel, especially the first officers on the scene to enter the building, and the clear coordination of the first supervisor on the scene, created a situation where victims could be quickly evacuated from the building. The coordination between MPD, MFD, and Hennepin EMS allowed for the evacuation and transport of all injured victims from the site to the hospital within the first twenty four minutes of the incident.

The response to this incident demonstrated strengths in the area of Communications, Public Safety and Security Response, Responder Health and Safety, and Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment. These observations in these areas demonstrated that established partnerships improved the response to this incident, although there are still areas for improvement. Communications, which are one of the areas that are not usually strengths during an incident response, were very effective, and provided some information lessons learned.

The areas that need improvement that were clearly identified during this event include On-site Incident Management, Intelligence and Information Sharing, and tracking of resources. There are obvious gaps in these areas that can be addressed to build a better response in the future, and can be addressed in many ways such as identifying new management systems, identifying culture changes, and integrated training to continue to build understanding and partnerships.

Finally, this after action report focuses on details and areas where improvement can be attained, but in the end, although this was a tragic situation, this was a very successful response for the Minneapolis Police Department, Minneapolis Fire Department, Hennepin EMS Ambulance, the City of Minneapolis, and all other assisting personnel who ensured that no other victims were harmed once first responders were on scene, that professionalism was maintained during the entire event, and the sense of security in the community was quickly restored.

APPENDIX A: LESSONS LEARNED

- The implementation of the 3 ECHO hostile events response, which was demonstrated by the integration of law enforcement and EMS personnel to create an evacuation corridor and evacuate patients, proved successful. Although two of the patients who were evacuated and transported quickly from the scene ended up passing away, this response provided the opportunity for medical intervention which was not available in past practices. This response moved beyond the integration of Fire personnel and EMS to work together to provide emergency medical care by including the law enforcement protection element so that EMS personnel could evacuate victims and ensure all were transported within the first twenty-four minutes of the incident.

- The success of this response reinforces the need to continue to train within law enforcement on establishing Incident Command, and Unified Command, to coordinate, command, and control the incident from the arrival of the first line supervisor through the transition of Incident Command. The success also reinforces the need to establish relationships across disciplines before large events occur so that unified command can be quickly established and coordinated.

- Finally, one of the lessons learned from this event is that even though all Command Staff personnel have attended advanced ICS training, there is a need to train and work together to coordinate responsibilities and expectations within the agency culture before an incident occurs.

APPENDIX B: MAP OF AREA



This is a satellite view of the incident location, marked as A on the map. Map from Google Maps.



This is a wider satellite view of Minneapolis with the incident location marked as A on the map. This view shows a portion of the northwest police precinct in the city. Map from Google Maps.

APPENDIX C: RELEASED INCIDENT INFORMATION

ACCENT SHOOTINGS
INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY

- Near the end of the workday, Engeldinger was asked to come to a meeting in the office of John Souter. Prior to going to Souter's office, Engeldinger left the building, went to his car, and then returned to meet with John Souter and Rami Cooks.
- Engeldinger was informed that his employment was terminated and he was given his final paycheck.
- Engeldinger pulled out a gun and a struggled ensued between the men over the gun.
- Souter and Cooks were shot inside Souter's office.
- Engeldinger dropped a partially loaded magazine during the struggle. He reloaded and stepped out of Souter's office.
- Reuven Rahamin stepped out of his office which is adjacent to Souter's office.
- Engeldinger shot Rahamin.
- With the gun in his hand, Engeldinger walked east in the building away from the executive offices, through double doors and into the space for sale's staff cubicles and sign displays.
- Engeldinger shot Jacob Beneke in the display area.
- With the gun in his hand, Engeldinger walked east in the building through another set of double doors into the loading dock area.
- In the loading dock area, Engeldinger shot Ron Edberg. He then turned a shot UPS driver Keith Basinski who was standing in his truck at the loading dock's edge.
- Engeldinger walked east through large sliding doors from the loading dock into the production area.
- Just on the other side of the doors, Engeldinger encountered two employees. He fired shots at them grazing one and hitting the other, Eric Rivers.
- Engeldinger turned around and walked back the way he came toward the loading dock and the western portions of the building including the stairway to the basement.
- Unwitnessed, Engeldinger walked downstairs into the basement where he took his own life. His body was located there by MPD officers. With him was the Glock 9mm.

VICTIMS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER:

- John Souter was shot in his office in the northwest area of the building. He transported to HCMC where he is being treated.
- Rami Cooks was shot in Souter's office. He was transported to HCMC where he died.
- Reuven Rahamin was shot outside the door to his office in the northwest area of the building. He died at the scene.
- Jacob Beneke was shot in the sales/display are of the building. He died at the scene.
- Ron Edberg was shot in the loading dock. He died at the scene.
- Keith Basinski (UPS) was shot is the loading dock. He died at the scene.
- Eric Rivers was shot in the production area at the eastern end of the building. He transported to HCMC where he is being treated.
- BW was grazed by a bullet in the production area. He was transported to HCMC where he was treated for a graze wound and released.

ACCENT SHOOTINGS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1. Had there been a history of threats by Andrew Engledinger in the workplace? We have no information that Engeldinger threatened others at the business in the time leading up the shootings.

2. Did Engeldinger have prior contact with MPD? The only prior contacts MPD had with Engeldinger were three property crimes cases between 2005 and 2011 in which Engeldinger was listed as the victim (damage to motor vehicle, auto theft and theft from auto).

3. What happened during the workday before the shooting? Thursday, September 27 was a normal workday in the hours leading up to the shooting. Engeldinger was at work in the business. The decision had been made by management that he would be terminated at the end of the day because of continued poor performance and lateness. At the conclusion of the workday, Engeldinger was asked to come to a meeting in the office of John Souter. Prior to going to Souter's office, Engeldinger left the building, went to his car, and then returned to meet with John Souter and Rami Cooks.

4. Was there a history of workplace conflict with Engeldinger? During the course of his employment, managers had counseled Engeldinger about his performance and lateness. The week prior to the shooting, Engeldinger had been reprimanded in writing. He was told at that time that his performance must improve immediately or he would be terminated.

5. What kind of gun was Engeldinger armed with? Engeldinger was armed with a Glock 9mm. He carried 2 magazines which were not extended. There were also loose rounds of ammunition recovered indicating that Engeldinger carried some additional rounds with him beyond what was loaded into the magazines.

6. Were any guns found in the search at Engeldinger's home? Another Glock 9mm handgun was recovered (loaded) from the home. In addition, there were spare Glock magazines, several boxes of ammunitions, an ankle holster, two gun cases, targets, gun cleaning supplies, permit to carry application materials, certification of completion for concealed carry training and empty shipping boxes that could have delivered approximately 10,000 rounds of ammunition.

7. Were the guns purchased legally? Yes.

8. Did Engeldinger practice shooting? Engeldinger was reported to have practiced at the Burnsville Rifle & Pistol Range.

9. Did Engeldinger have a permit to carry? The law does not allow for the release of information concerning whether or not a person has a permit to carry.

10. When will the investigative information be available to the public? Because the offender is deceased, there will be no criminal court proceedings; therefore, at the conclusion of the investigation, all information deemed public under the MN data practices statute will be available. (Charges may apply.) Requests for case materials will be filled in the order they are received and may be made electronically at:
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups/public/@mpd/documents/webcontent/convert_259734.pdf

APPENDIX D: PRESS RELEASES

Police Department - 130 City Hall - 350 S. 5th St. - Minneapolis, MN 55415

Media Release

Contact:
Sgt. William Palmer 612-919-9362 william.palmer@ci.minneapolis.mn.us
Sgt. Stephen McCarty 612-919-9118 stephen.mccarty@ci.minneapolis.mn.us

TO PROTECT WITH COURAGE / TO SERVE WITH COMPASSION

Shooter kills four at Accent Signage

September 28, 2012 (MINNEAPOLIS) Yesterday at 4:35 p.m. Minneapolis Police officers were dispatched to Accent Signage Systems Incorporated at 2322 Chestnut Avenue West on a shots fired call.

As officers were en route, the Minneapolis Emergency Communication Center received several 911 hang up calls from this location and information from a caller that someone was shot inside the business.

When officers arrived and entered the business to assist with the evacuation of employees, give aid to the victims and to search for the suspect, they found four victims dead from apparent gunshot wounds.

Among the dead, was an individual identified as the suspect, it appeared that he died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. The five individuals will be identified by the Hennepin County Medical Examiner Office and their exact causes of death will be released after their investigation is complete.

Four victims were transported to the Hennepin County Medical Center; three of the victims are listed in critical condition with gunshot wounds. The fourth victim had minor injuries.

The Minneapolis Police Department was assisted by multiple agencies including, the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Brooklyn Park Police Department, the Roseville Police Department, the Minnesota State Patrol, Hennepin County Paramedics and the Minneapolis Fire Department. Other area agency offered their assistance.

At this time the Minneapolis Police Department and Hennepin County Crime Labs are processing the scene along with Minneapolis Homicide Investigators and Hennepin County Medical Examiners.

The PIO contact for this release is Sergeant Stephen McCarty.

# # #

CRIME STOPPERS of Minnesota
CrimeStoppersMN.org
1-800-222-TIPS

APPENDIX E: SITUATION REPORT AND OPERATIONS PLAN: SECOND OPERATIONAL PERIOD

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Situation Report & Operations Plan

Active Shooter / Mass Homicide
Accent Signage Systems, 2322 Chestnut Av. W.

EVENT: Ongoing Operations at Mass Shooting / Homicide Scene, CCN 12-305857

INCIDENT COMMANDER: Insp. Martin **Call Sign**: 401

INVESTIGATIONS COMMANDER: Capt. Huffman **Call Sign**: 7701

COMMAND LOCATION: Command Post - Chestnut Av. W. / Russell Av. S.

DATE: 9/27/12 – 9/28/12 **Operational Period:** 2200 – 0600 Hours.

STAGING: Command Post

COMMUNICATIONS: MPD Ch. 4

SITUATIONAL REPORT

HISTORY:

On 9/27/2012 at 1635 hours a lone gunman came into Accent Signage Systems, 2322 Chestnut Ave. W., and began shooting people. This male, later identified as Andrew John Engeldinger 1/27/76, was a 12-year employee of the business who had been fired earlier in the day. Engeldinger parked his vehicle outside the business and appears to have entered through the loading dock service door. He shot and killed a UPS driver making a delivery on the dock. He shot and killed three employees inside the business. He shot three other employees who were all transported to HCMC in critical condition (one has since died). Finally, he went to the basement and shot himself in the head. He died from the self-inflicted gunshot wound.

There were at least 25 other employees in the business at the time of the shooting. Some of them called 911 and or fled out of the business.

SITUATIONAL REPORT (OPS PERIOD 9/27/12, 1630 - 2200 HRS):

Officers responded to this as an active shooter situation. The first responding officers helped evacuate the employees and critical patients and maintained a tight perimeter. Sgts. Mosey and Billy Peterson arrived and formed SWAT Teams to hold the hot perimeter and clear the building. They systematically

searched the building while other officers expanded the perimeter and evacuated witness employees to a safe location. Multiple agencies responded to assist, including Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, Brooklyn Park PD, State Patrol, East Metro SWAT, FBI Safe Street Task Force, ATF, Minneapolis Fire, Hennepin County EMS, HCMC Ambulance, and others.

Insp. Martin arrived and assumed incident command. Lt. Mike Sullivan was present and was assigned to supervise the safe maintenance of the inner hot perimeter until SWAT cleared the building. Sgt. Mosey was assigned to tactical command of the outside of the building and Sgt. Billy Peterson was the tactical commander inside the building. The perimeter was expanded and maintained by MPD and HCSO staff. A Command Post (CP) was established at Chestnut and Thomas.

DC Arneson arrived and assumed the position of Administration Representative at the CP. Insp. Martin became the Unified Incident Commander. Lt. Zimmerman worked investigative command until Capt. Huffman arrived. Capt. Huffman was then assigned as the Investigations Chief under Unified Command. Insp. Frizell arrived and was assigned as the Planning Chief and tasked with planning for staffing and the next operational period. Capt. Zimmer of the HCSO agreed to be the Logistics Chief and coordinate perimeter security. Sgt. McCarty was present and took control of Public Information and Media Staging.

The building was cleared and the suspect, Andrew Engeldinger, was found deceased from an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound in the basement. HCSO and Brooklyn Park PD SWAT officers staged at the 4th Precinct and eventually responded to clear Engeldinger's home address at 3721 12th Avenue South.

SSA Rob Woldt from the FBI called to offer any assistance we needed. Some of his personnel were already present and assisting with perimeter security. SSA A.J. Frye from the ATF responded with other personnel to assist. They were able to order a quick trace on the firearm involved, a Glock 9mm semi-auto. Initial indications are that the handgun was purchased in recent weeks by the suspect as a new firearm.

Mayor Rybak, CM Goodman and CM Samuels all came to the scene. A media briefing was held at approximately 1930 hours. Mayor Rybak and DC Arneson addressed a large contingent of media.

At approximately 2030 hours, after consulting with Capt. Huffman, Insp. Martin contracted the perimeter and moved the CP and Command Vehicles to Chestnut and Russell. The perimeter was maintained by MPD and HCSO personnel. Insp. Martin also deactivated the Unified Command. Lt. Holthusen arrived and assisted in relieving perimeter staff and planning for upcoming staffing.

Officers Richard Walker, Rod Weber, and Michael Griffin were given three days of Admin Leave. They were the first officers to arrive and evacuate victims and witnesses in a very chaotic and bloody scene. They are being debriefed by the Chaplain.

The Minneapolis Crime Lab and HCSO Crime Lab are currently processing the scene, accompanied by Chief Medical Examiner Baker and a team from the Hennepin County Medical Examiner's Office.

The Salvation Army is on scene providing food and hydration to personnel.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR THIS OPERATIONAL PERIOD (9/27, 2200 hrs – 9/28, 0600 hrs):

None of the victims have been positively identified. That information will come from the Medical Examiner's Office. Family and friends have been coming to the scene seeking information.

Crime Lab personnel and the Medical Examiner's Office are processing the scene and expect to be working throughout the night. A perimeter will be maintained to protect the scene and Mobile Command 1 will remain at the scene as long as needed by Homicide.

Sgt. Katie Blackwell will supervise the scene until 0200 hours and will then be relieved by Sgt. Chuck Peter. Lt. Zimmerman is supervising the Homicide investigators. Sgts. Ann Kjos and Chris Karakostas will be assigned the case.

OPERATIONS PLAN

MISSION:

- Provide for the safety of personnel working the scene.
- Maintain the perimeter to protect evidence and the dignity of the victims.
- Re-establish a sense of safety and security in the community.
- Successfully process and collect evidence.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES:

- The Incident Commander will provide overall command of the operation, ensure proper staffing and provide direction to detailed supervisors. The Incident Commander will also coordinate with other agencies as needed.
- The Detail Supervisors will provide direction to officers and will adjust operations when needed.

PATROL DUTIES:

- Maintain perimeter.
- Assist residents with access as needed.
- Assist investigators and Crime Lab Personnel as needed.
- Perform other duties as assigned by Command and Supervisory Staff.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED:

- Mobile Command 1
- Crime Scene Tape for perimeter.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

- Precinct officers will be assigned to conduct high-visibility patrol in the Bryn Mawr area to reassure residents and reestablish a sense of safety.
- Homicide and Crime Lab personnel believe the scene will need to maintained throughout the day on 9/28/12.

Respectfully Submitted,

Inspector Mike Martin

APPENDIX F: SITUATION REPORT AND OPERATIONS PLAN: THIRD OPERATIONAL PERIOD

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Situation Report & Operations Plan

Active Shooter / Mass Homicide
Accent Signage Systems, 2322 Chestnut Av. W.

EVENT: Ongoing Operations at Mass Shooting / Homicide Scene

INCIDENT COMMANDER: Insp. Martin **Call Sign**: 401

INVESTIGATIONS COMMANDER: Capt. Huffman **Call Sign**: 7701

COMMAND LOCATION: 2322 Chestnut Ave. W. (MC1)

DATE: 9/28/12 **Operational Period:** 1000 – 2200 Hours.

STAGING: Command Post

COMMUNICATIONS: MPD Ch. 4

SITUATIONAL REPORT

HISTORY:

On 9/27/2012 at 1635 hours a lone gunman came into Accent Signage Systems, 2322 Chestnut Ave. W., and began shooting people. This male, later identified as Andrew John Engeldinger 1/27/76, was a 12-year employee of the business who had been fired earlier in the day. Engeldinger parked his vehicle outside the business and appears to have entered through the loading dock service door. He shot and killed a UPS driver making a delivery on the dock. He shot and killed three employees inside the business. He shot three other employees who were all transported to HCMC in critical condition (one has since died). Finally, he went to the basement and shot himself in the head. He died from the self-inflicted gunshot wound.

There were at least 25 other employees in the business at the time of the shooting. Some of them called 911 and or fled out of the business.

Officers responded to this as an active shooter situation. The first responding officers helped evacuate the employees and critical patients and maintained a tight perimeter. Sgts. Mosey and Billy Peterson arrived and formed SWAT Teams to hold the hot perimeter and clear the building. They systematically searched the building while other officers expanded the perimeter and evacuated witness employees to a

safe location. Multiple agencies responded to assist, including Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, Brooklyn Park PD, State Patrol, East Metro SWAT, FBI Safe Street Task Force, ATF, Minneapolis Fire, Hennepin County EMS, HCMC Ambulance, and others.

Insp. Martin arrived and assumed incident command. Lt. Mike Sullivan was present and was assigned to supervise the safe maintenance of the inner hot perimeter until SWAT cleared the building. Sgt. Mosey was assigned to tactical command of the outside of the building and Sgt. Billy Peterson was the tactical commander inside the building. The perimeter was expanded and maintained by MPD and HCSO staff. A Command Post (CP) was established at Chestnut and Thomas.

DC Arneson arrived and assumed the position of Administration Representative at the CP. Insp. Martin became the Unified Incident Commander. Lt. Zimmerman worked investigative command until Capt. Huffman arrived. Capt. Huffman was then assigned as the Investigations Chief under Unified Command. Insp. Frizell arrived and was assigned as the Planning Chief and tasked with planning for staffing and the next operational period. Capt. Zimmer of the HCSO agreed to be the Logistics Chief and coordinate perimeter security. Sgt. McCarty was present and took control of Public Information and Media Staging.

The building was cleared and the suspect, Andrew Engeldinger, was found deceased from an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound in the basement. HCSO and Brooklyn Park PD SWAT officers staged at the 4th Precinct and eventually responded to clear Engeldinger's home address at 3721 12th Avenue South.

Witness employees were interviewed by investigators and transported to the 4th Precinct to arrange for meeting relatives or arranging rides.

SSA Rob Woldt from the FBI called to offer any assistance we needed. Some of his personnel were already present and assisting with perimeter security. SSA A.J. Frye from the ATF responded with other personnel to assist. They were able to order a quick trace on the firearm involved, a Glock 9mm semi-auto. Initial indications are that the handgun was purchased in recent weeks by the suspect as a new firearm.

Mayor Rybak, CM Goodman and CM Samuels all came to the scene. A media briefing was held at approximately 1930 hours. Mayor Rybak and DC Arneson addressed a large contingent of media.

At approximately 2030 hours, after consulting with Capt. Huffman, Insp. Martin contracted the perimeter and moved the CP and Command Vehicles to Chestnut and Russell. The perimeter was maintained by MPD and HCSO personnel. Insp. Martin also deactivated the Unified Command. Lt. Holthusen arrived and assisted in relieving perimeter staff and planning for upcoming staffing.

Officers Richard Walker, Rod Weber, and Michael Griffin were given three days of Admin Leave. They were the first officers to arrive and evacuate victims and witnesses in a very chaotic and bloody scene. They are being debriefed by the Chaplain.

SITUATIONAL REPORT (OPS PERIOD 9/28/12, 1000 - 2200 HRS):

The Hennepin County Medical Examiner's Office has removed all of the bodies from the scene. Crime Lab Personnel and Homicide Investigators will be returning to the scene at 1400 hours to continue their work.

Officers continue to maintain the perimeter at the business and assist residents with access to vehicles and houses. Chestnut Avenue is blocked from Penn Av. N. to Russell at this time. Mobile Command 1 has returned to the scene for use by investigators.

Capt. Huffman reported that the investigation continues with witness interviews and evidence gathering.

A Family and Victim Assistance Center has been established at the MPD 4th Precinct Community Room. Survivor Resources will be assisting those affected and in need of counseling or information. Lt. Hayhoe is supervising this.

Sgt. McCarty and City Communications Staff have planned a press conference for 1415 hours at Bryn Mawr Presbyterian Church, 420 S. Cedar Lake Road.

OPERATIONS PLAN

MISSION:

- Provide for the safety of personnel working the scene.
- Maintain the perimeter to protect evidence and the dignity of the victims.
- Re-establish a sense of safety and security in the community.
- Successfully process and collect evidence.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES:

- The Incident Commander will provide overall command of the operation, ensure proper staffing and provide direction to detailed supervisors. The Incident Commander will also coordinate with other agencies as needed.
- The Detail Supervisors will provide direction to officers and will adjust operations when needed.

PATROL DUTIES:

- Maintain perimeter.
- Assist residents with access as needed.
- Assist investigators and Crime Lab Personnel as needed.
- Perform other duties as assigned by Command and Supervisory Staff.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED:

- Mobile Command 1
- Crime Scene Tape for perimeter.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

- Precinct officers will be assigned to conduct high-visibility patrol in the Bryn Mawr area to reassure residents and reestablish a sense of safety.
- Homicide and Crime Lab personnel believe the scene will need to be maintained throughout the day on 9/28/12.

Respectfully Submitted,

Inspector Mike Martin

APPENDIX G: ACRONYMS

Table F.1: *Acronyms*

Acronym	Meaning
AAR	After Action Report
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
CID	Criminal Investigations Division
CISM	Critical Incident Stress Management
Code 4	Law Enforcement meaning everything is under control
CP	Command Post
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
FOUO	For Official Use Only
HCMC	Hennepin County Medical Center
HCSO	Hennepin County Sheriff's Office
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Command
ICS	Incident Command System
LTAC	Law Enforcement Tactical Channel
MECC	Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center
MFD	Minneapolis Fire Department
MN	Minnesota
MPD	Minneapolis Police Department
MSP	Minnesota State Patrol
NIMS	National Incident Management System
PTAC	Public Safety Tactical Channel
SA	Salvation Army
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics Unit
UC	Unified Command
3 ECHO	A specific Hostile Events Training Response Program in Minnesota